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Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of the shape of regional trade agreements (RTAs).
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ments, such as common markets or custom unions. On the contrary, international insecurity deters less
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I Introduction
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are an increasingly important feature of the inter-
national trading system - as of September 2006, 156 RTAs notified to the WTO under
Enabling Clause and GATT Art. XXIV were in force. Their shape however greatly differs
throughout the world. They range from the simple exchange of preferences on a limited
number of products to the elimination of almost all tariff barriers and, beyond, the harmo-
nization of standards and rules on services, intellectual property rights and competition.
Existing literature provides no theory to explain these differences. The usual classification,
derived from Balassa (1961), sorts RTAs from the least integrated to the more integrated,
as a step by step approach to economic union, through free trade area, customs union
and common market. The implicit assumption behind is that more integrated arrange-
ments provide a deeper trade integration.1 Empirical evidence of a larger effect of more
integrated RTAs on intra-regional trade are however lacking (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004;
Vicard, 2007), as are historical illustrations of gradual regional integration processes -
custom unions are mostly created directly as such whereas free trade agreements almost
never evolve into custom unions (CU). Out of the 18 customs unions created worldwide
since 1948, 14 have been created directly as such, without any intermediate step such as a
preferential arrangement (PA) or a free trade agreement (FTA). It suggests that determi-
nants of the shape of RTAs have to be found elsewhere. This paper addresses the question
of the endogenous formation of RTAs and investigates the determinants of their shape.
In this respect, an important and rather ignored facet of regionalism is the security
issue.2 In an international system where no institution or third party can enforce property
rights at the supranational level, gains from trade may be damaged because of interstate
conflicts. Since interstate disputes occur under the threat of military force, and can thus
lead to the disruption of trade (Glick and Taylor, 2005; Martin et al., 2008), the shadow of
conflict may have a significant influence on the design of international economic policies.
Specialization and greater dependence on trade involve risks; trade and security issues are
thus intertwined and their interplays should shape the decision of creating a RTA. The
demand for an insurance mechanism, securing the continuity of trade relationships in the
future, should therefore increase with the level of trade integration.
Regional economic integration is likely to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes
through two main channels. By favoring intra-regional trade over extra-regional trade,
1In his seminal paper, Balassa (1961) however also mentions social integration, but he dismisses this
second criteria.
2Historically, several regional integration processes, such as the European Union - the preamble to
the Paris Treaty of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community “resolved to substitute for
age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interest; to create, by establishing an economic community,
the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts.” -, and the
MERCOSUR explicitly refer to security concerns (World Bank, 2000).
RTAs increase the opportunity cost of war (Martin et al., 2008; Oneal and Russett, 1997,
1999; Barbieri, 2002) and thus promote the negotiated settlements of conflicts. On the
other hand, the creation of supranational institutions to negotiate and implement common
rules favors the exchange of information on military capabilities and resolve in conflicts,
and strengthens trust among political leaders, thus favoring commitment and the peaceful
resolution of interstate disputes (Bearce, 2003; Bearce and Omori, 2005; Haftel, 2007).
Though, the regional institutional frameworks created along regional integration greatly
differ according to the kind of RTAs; only the more integrated RTAs, such as customs
unions and common markets, require a significant common institutional framework likely
to promote negotiated settlement of disputes. Accordingly, the depth of a regional agree-
ment can be defined in relation with the level of political/institutional integration it entails.
Adopting a broad definition of international organizations, including the regulation of in-
terstate relations, and defining RTAs by their ability to manage interstate disputes allow
to understand why the shape of RTAs differs around the world.
The decision to form a RTA is investigated both theoretically and empirically. I build
on the recent political economy literature on political (dis)integration (Alesina and Spo-
laore, 2003)3 and develop a model of RTA formation in the shadow of conflicts. Then,
I show how, in this framework, differentiating RTAs by their ability to foster the peace-
ful resolution of interstate disputes, i.e. the depth of institutional integration, leads to
different determinants in the choice to create a RTA. In my framework, economic and
political boundaries are not inevitably similar: governments can decide to enlarge their
market size, by forming a RTA, whereas the defence policy remains at the national level.
Trade and security issues are thus simultaneously introduced in a model of political inte-
gration. Conditions under which regionalism endogenously takes place for given level of
trade openness and interstate insecurity are derived. I find that countries will accept to
depend more on a partner only if the trade related gains from integration are not offset by
larger potential costs related to an increased dependency on a given trading partner under
RTA. The effect of international insecurity and globalization on gains from the creation
of a RTA are thus found to depend on the impact of RTAs on dispute escalation to war
probabilities. So, in that framework, RTAs can be differentiated according to their ability
to reduce the likelihood of interstate dispute escalation to war, i.e. according to the level
of political or institutional integration they entail.
This theoretical model provides us with a framework to conduct the empirical analysis
of the determinants of the shape of RTAs. A preliminary step of the empirical analysis
is to distinguish the different kind of RTAs. I first investigate the hypothesis that the
3It shows how, because large countries benefit from a market size advantage (Alesina et al., 2000) or
a scale advantage in defence (Alesina and Spolaore, 2006), international trade openness or international
insecurity determine the number and size of countries.
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effect of RTA membership on the likelihood of dispute escalation to war differs according
to the depth of integration. Only customs unions and common markets are found to foster
the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes; these kinds of RTAs are then regarded as
deep agreements, whereas preferential arrangements or free trade agreements are shallow
agreements. I then investigate the determinants of the formation of different kinds of
RTAs on a large dataset covering 87 countries over the 1970-2000 period. I use events
data to assess the occurrence of interstate disputes, and address endogeneity issues related
to past membership to RTAs using instrumental variables. Two implications of the model
are confirmed empirically: (i) countries undergoing many interstate disputes create deeply
integrated RTAs, such as custom union or common market, whereas the opposite is true
concerning shallow agreements ; (ii) globalization, through a reduction in physical barriers
to trade, promotes more the creation of deep RTAs than shallow RTAs.
Based on a theoretical model of endogenous formation of RTAs, this paper thus pro-
vides empirical evidence that the determinants of RTA creation between two countries
differ according to the kind of RTA that is created. To the best of my knowledge, it is the
first assessment of the determinants of the shape of RTAs. Besides their effect on tariffs,
my model explicitly emphasizes the role of RTAs as a regulating mechanism for interstate
relations. The approach of RTAs developed in this paper relates to the studies of the
institutional design of international trade agreements (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002), which
emphasizes in particular that RTAs can be regarded as commitment devices and solve
a time-consistency problem vis-a-vis the domestic private sector (Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare, 1998; Mitra, 2002) or a terms-of-trade-driven prisoners’ dilemma (Ornelas, 2005).
Here, depending on their shape, RTAs can work as a means for governments to insure
against armed conflicts and the disruption of trade in the future. The absence of such
an insurance mechanism would thus create security risks for pairs of countries undergoing
many interstates disputes, and question their openness to trade. As a regulation mecha-
nism, regionalism would be a complement to multilateralism.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. The next section presents regional
trade integration in light of the theory of war. In section 3, I develop the theoretical
model of regional integration in an insecure international system and derive endogenously
conditions under which regional integration will take place. Section 4 presents data and
econometric results related to the effect of RTAs on war and the determinants of each kind
of RTA.
II Regional trade integration and the theory of war
Based on historical examples, World Bank (2000) underlines that the shape of integration
matter regarding its effect on regional security. The European Union or the MERCOSUR
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are prominent illustrations of security enhancing RTAs, whereas examples of regional inte-
gration processes triggering intra-regional conflicts include the CACM, with the outbreak
of an armed conflict between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, or the East African Com-
mon Market, which enhanced conflicts between Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya and led to
give up the common market agenda, close borders and the seizure of Community assets in
1978. The reasoning explaining these alternative effects of trade integration on war prob-
abilities rests on the fact that, while creating gains, trade also creates winners and losers.
For instance, the agglomeration of industries in one country can be detrimental to another
country or region, thus increasing interstate disputes. Any policy aiming at increasing
international integration is nevertheless likely to raise dispute issues; the question is then
to understand what drives the choice to settle disputes through negotiation rather than
war and how international institutions could affect these mechanisms.
As far as destructions are involved, the use of armed force to resolve disputes is a
second best outcome and is always Pareto dominated by a negotiated settlement. A
rationalist explanation of war states that wars occur because state leaders are unable to
reach ex ante a mutually advantageous arrangement on conflict issues.4 The question is
then to understand what prevents leaders to find and/or implement a bargaining solution
to resolve their disputes. Only three arguments fit a rationalist definition of war (Fearon,
1995): asymmetries of information on resolve or military capabilities with incentives to
misrepresent them (see Levy and Razin (2004) for a formal model), commitment problems,
and issue indivisibility. Accordingly, Grossman (2004a) develops a formal model of peace
and war in territorial disputes with complete information, which highlights the importance
of divisibility of the outcome of the dispute, the effectiveness of fortifications and counter-
attack (or first-striker advantage) and on the permanence of the outcome of a potential
war.5
Based on these rationalist explanations of war, Bearce (2003) identifies three chan-
nels through which RTAs could facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts and prevent
disputes to spillover into war. The first one is related to an opportunity cost analysis:
because regional trade integration increases gains from trade and war disrupts bilateral
trade (Martin et al., 2008; Glick and Taylor, 2005), the opportunity cost of war between
members is larger. It would thus encourages governments to consider peaceful bargains
instead of war. Second, RTAs create supranational institutions aiming at managing con-
flicts, such as dispute settlement mechanisms for instance. These institutions avoid the
4The rationalist view of war is widely developed by political scientist as well as economists. Two
alternative theories of war exist. One explains war occurrence by the irrationality of state leaders; the
second assumes that leaders may benefit from war without suffering the costs whose load rests on soldiers
or citizens. See Jackson and Massimo (2007) for a model explaining war occurrence as an agency problem
in a principal-agent framework, despite the existence of complete information about winning probabilities
and the availability of bargaining possibilities through transfer paiement.
5Grossman (2004b) documents historical examples illustrating the previous model.
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politization of disputes, thus limiting the opportunity to use armed force in the event of
conflict. Disputes on economic issues are nevertheless generally not likely to spillover into
war. Yet, international institutions are also an important mechanism of collection and
diffusion of information. Institutions created along regional integration processes promote
the exchange of information on and between member states on a wide range of issues,
on trade but also on security and military issues. Indeed, some RTAs include formal
security/military substructures and/or cooperation through joint military exercises and
defence minister forums. These are likely to reveal information on military capabilities as
well as opponent’s resolve and patience in disputes so as to reduce asymmetries of infor-
mation and to favor the identification and the negotiation of mutually beneficial solutions.
The exchange of information on military capabilities also reduces the opportunities for
surprise attacks. Third, negotiation cannot prevails if any agreement reached cannot be
credibly enforced, which is often the case in an international system where no third party
or supranational institution is able to enforce property rights (Grossman, 2004b).6 By cre-
ating rooms for discussion and negotiations, regular meetings of head of states and high
level officials, or the existence of an executive secretariat, promote the creation of trust
between political leaders and mitigate the problem of credible commitment in interstate
negotiations. By promoting the early settlement of disputes and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts, institutions created along with regional trade integration are likely to provide
a positive externality in terms of national security and to reduce the risk war (Bearce and
Omori, 2005; Haftel, 2007).
Regional integration not only provides trade preferences, but also works as a regu-
lating mechanism for economic and more broadly interstate relations. As underlined by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), economic integration has more to do with domestic
policies (regulation, norms, property rights, infrastructures...) than direct trade policy
instruments (tariffs, quotas...).7 The harmonization and implementation of such policies
at the regional level require the creation of common institutions and, possibly, the provi-
sion of public goods at the regional level. It thus entails some degree of supranationalism,
limiting state sovereignty. Though, the institutional framework and its degree of suprana-
tionalism greatly differ according to the kind of RTA. Creating a custom union requires
to agree on a common external tariff and revenue distribution between state members. A
common market (CM) requires more complete political institutions to agree on a broader
set of issues (harmonization of regulation and standards, free movement of goods and
factors,...)8, whereas a free trade agreement or a preferential arrangement involve a weak
6Jackson and Massimo (2007) also show, in a setting where countries fight because of political biases of
their leaders, that when state leaders lack the ability to credibly commit to a negotiated deal, the range
for negotiated settlement of disputes is reduced.
7They argue that, out of an overall border barrier of 44%, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers to trade
represent only 8%.
8See, for instance, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) for a detailed mapping of policy areas carried out at
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institutional framework and a limited political integration.9 According to this political
integration criteria, two categories of RTAs can be distinguished: customs unions and
common markets on the one hand, and preferential arrangements and free trade agree-
ments on the other. Only the former implies the creation of a significant institutional
framework likely to provide a security externality, by favoring the peaceful resolution of
conflicts and reducing probabilities of dispute escalation to war. The latter involves no or
few political or institutional integration.
III A model of regional integration in the shadow of conflict
The literature on political integration focuses on the question of country formation by
citizens in regions. Instead, we are interested here in the formation of regional trade agree-
ments by independent countries, i.e. how states can share common economic boundaries
while retaining independent political boundaries (defence policy). Indeed, the argument
provided by Alesina et al. (2000) of a trade-off between gains from large market size and
heterogeneity costs of political integration is also relevant when countries create a RTA,
i.e. a regional market. On the other hand, defence policy remains a national prerogative.
I embed a conflict game and a simple model of trade in a political integration framework,
to derive the effect of both trade and security issues on the endogenous formation of RTAs.
Discriminating economic and political integration then allow to highlight the determinants
of different kinds of RTAs.
1 The basic setting
I build on the framework developed by Alesina and Spolaore (2005) to construct a model
of regional integration, in which a discrete number of countries interact in an insecure
world. Governments have to choose their defence capabilities and whether or not to enter
a RTA, given that:
• entering a RTA means the removal of restrictions to trade with other members and
thus provides productivity gains for the population, but entails heterogeneity costs;
• countries face interstate disputes over resources or production, and those are resolved
either peacefully or through war;
• war disrupts trade with the opponent.
the EU level, and Bouzas and Soltz (2000) concerning the institutional framework of MERCOSUR.
9The ASEAN free trade agreement provides an illustrative example, with weak regional institutions in
order to limit any supranationalism (Best, 2005). Pomfret (1997) also emphasizes how the will to limit
political integration has been incidental to the creation of NAFTA.
6
As in Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p.116), “a country is defined as an independent political
unit in which (1) defence is completely and credibly centralized, (2) a unified government
takes decisions over bargaining and war strategies, and (3) the net returns from conflict are
distributed across its citizens”. While retaining an independent national security policy,
countries can decide to create a RTA with a partner, thus benefiting from a larger domestic
market, i.e. an area free of barriers to trade. As usual in the literature on political
integration, entering a RTA entails heterogeneity costs k, “due to the necessity of keeping
together individuals with different interests, preferences, culture, and history” (Alesina
et al., 1995). Indeed, economic integration implies common policies and the provision of
some public goods at the regional level, which move away actual policies from individual
ideal/preferences in each country.
Because, at the supranational level, no institution holds the monopoly of legitimate
violence and can properly enforce property rights, countries face appropriation possibilities
on a part R of their income (0 < R < Yi). Disputes over income distribution are resolved
either peacefully or through war according to the conflict game outcome. A dispute occurs
worldwide with probability ρ and is located uniformly between any pair of neighboring
countries, so that each of them undergoes a dispute with probability ρ4 . So, a country
cannot engage in two wars.
The model is a 3-stages game: (1) countries first decide whether or not to form RTAs,
(2) then they choose their defence spending, and finally (3) uncertainty about dispute
location and escalation probabilities are revealed and conflicts are resolved. This timing
appears relevant because forming a RTA takes time and is meant to last a long time;
building defence capabilities is also a medium term process, but is less time consuming;
and disputes occur and are resolved in the short term. The model has no time dimension.
It is solved by backward induction.
The government of each country i chooses whether or not to form a RTA and the
amount of resources devoted to defence spending di (0 ≤ di ≤ Yi)10 to maximize national
utility, defined by:
Ui = Yi − φij kij +
∑
j 6=i
Rij − di ∀i, j (1)
where Yi is national income, φij is a dummy variable which equals 1 if countries i and j
form a RTA, and Rij is the expected net return from conflict.11
In order to keep the model tractable, the world is assumed to be divided into four
countries distributed out of two continents, East and West (see figure 1). The cost of
10For simplicity, I assume that the constraint di ≤ Yi is never binding in equilibrium.
11Each country is considered as a unified agent. We thus abstract from any non-unitary actor issue.
Considering how the form of government could affect its decisions could be an interesting extension of the
model.
7
forming a RTA between Eastern and Western countries is assumed to be prohibitive,
because of wide differences in national preferences. One RTA can thus be created on each
continent. On the other hand, each country shares a border with two other countries and
can thus undergo international conflicts with each of them.
1 4
W E
2 3
Figure 1: A 4 countries / 2 continents world
2 War and peace: the conflict game
The conflict game is based on a rationalist explanation of war, i.e. war occurs because some
factors make state leaders unable to reach ex ante a mutually advantageous arrangement
on conflict issues. Indeed, as far as destructions are involved, the use of armed force to
resolve disputes is a second best outcome and is always Pareto dominated by a negotiated
settlement. The question is then to understand what prevents leaders to find and/or
implement a bargaining solution. Fearon (1995) argues that only three arguments fit a
rationalist definition of war: asymmetries of information on resolve or military capabilities
with incentives to misrepresent them, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. The
model of conflict below, adapted from Alesina and Spolaore (2005), relies on the second
argument: wars occur because state leaders are unable to credibly commit to hold their
position.
Consider two countries i and j evolving in an anarchic world, i.e. where no suprana-
tional institution or third party can enforce law. A part R (0 < R < Yi) of their national
income is potentially subject to appropriation activities. It is worth noting that any con-
flict issues affecting national utility could be at stake, either on resource, rent sharing or
ideology. A dispute may be settled through bargaining or through war. If both countries
choose to fight, the distribution of payoffs depends on the relative military strength of
opponents and each country undergoes war costs. A traditional ratio contest success func-
tion defines how the valuable pie 2R is distributed in case of military fight (Hirschleifer,
1988). When both countries choose the fighting strategy, payoffs are the followings:
Rffi = 2R
di
di + dj
− Cij
Rffj = 2R
dj
di + dj
− Cji (2)
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where di (dj) is country i’s (j’s) military spending and Cij stands for war costs.12 War
costs are symmetric, i.e. Cij = Cji (see below).
When both countries choose to bargain, the pie subject to appropriation 2R is dis-
tributed according to the Nash bargaining solution. As in Alesina and Spolaore (2005), the
war outcome is chosen as disagreement point, i.e. country i receives a fraction bij = didi+dj
of the valuable pie 2R when the dispute is settled peacefully.13
As far as war is costly, the war outcome is always Pareto dominated by the bargaining
outcome. In absence of any other specification, the dominant strategy is (bargain, bargain).
But as Grossman (2004a) outlines, a peaceful negotiated settlement is credible only if none
has incentives to deviate, i.e. each opponent is left better off with the status quo than if
he starts a war. In this respect, if a military advantage of attacking exists, and if that
advantage exceeds the cost of war, none can credibly commit not to deviate. This first
striker advantage, denoted Eij , could materialize through a higher probability of winning
or smaller war damages. It is assumed that Eij is the same for the two opponents and that
the country choosing to bargain when its opponent attacks undergoes a mirroring cost Eji
of equal magnitude (Eji = Eij). Strategy sets and outcomes are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Conflict game outcomes
Ctry j
Bargain Fight
Ctry i
Bargain (2R
di
di+dj
; 2R
dj
di+dj
)
(
2R di
di+dj
− Cij − Eji ;
2R
dj
di+dj
− Cji + Eij
)
Fight
(
2R di
di+dj
− Cij + Eij ;
2R
dj
di+dj
− Cji − Eji
) (2R didi+dj − Cij ;
2R
dj
di+dj
− Cji
)
So in a situation where the first striker advantage is sufficiently large, i.e. if Eij >
Cij , the Pareto-optimal strategy, where both countries choose to bargain, is not a Nash-
equilibrium. Given the opponent strategy, a country has incentives to deviate and strike
first. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the only Nash equilibrium is (fight,
fight). Otherwise (Eij ≤ Cij), both (bargain, bargain) and (fight, fight) profiles are Nash
12 di
di+dj
can be understood either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the pie country i
won in the event of war, when states are risk neutral. The former interpretation is privileged here.
13We have: bij = max
(
2R bij − 2R didi+dj + Cij
)(
2R (1− bij)− 2R djdi+dj + Cji
)
s.t. 2R bij ≥
2R di
di+dj
− Cij , 2R (1− bij) ≥ 2R djdi+dj − Cji.
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equilibriums.
Using refinements introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) on coalition of players14, a
unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium emerges in each situation: depending on the level
of the first striker advantage Eij relative to the cost of war Cij , a unique coalition-proof
Nash-equilibrium exists; the strategy profile outcome is (bargain, bargain) if Eij ≤ Cij ,
and (fight, fight) if Eij > Cij .
The width of the first striker advantage is determined by factors such as military tech-
nology and capabilities, geography, economic and political situations, or the availability
of information on opponent’s strength. Here, I assume Eij to be a random variable, fully
revealed after decisions on defence spending have been made. In fact, when choosing their
defence capabilities, countries do not know the location of disputes and the incentives
to unilaterally deviate from the bargaining solution in specific conflicts. When defence
are built, the location and first striker advantage are revealed to all actors, which seems
plausible since building military capabilities requires time, so that decisions on military
spending take place without full information on future conflicts. Then, we can derive a
probability of dispute escalation to war, noted piij = Pr(Eij > Cij). A dispute ends up in
war with probability piij and is settled peacefully with probability 1− piij .
The expected net return from conflict between two countries i and j can now be
computed. It depends on the probability of dispute occurrence ρ, the probability of dispute
escalation to war piij and the revenue subject to appropriation R as follows:
Rij =
ρ
4
[(
2R
di
di + dj
− piijCij
)
−R
]
(3)
3 Trade, income, and regional integration
Alesina et al. (2000) show that per capita income and growth rate are positively related
to country size and openness to trade, and negatively related to country size multiplied by
openness, i.e. smaller countries benefit more from trade openness than larger countries.
Their argument is that larger countries enjoy a larger market size free of barriers to trade,
which is more beneficial when trading with the rest of the world is difficult, i.e. when
the global regime of trade is less free. This argument is just as much relevant concerning
regional trade integration. Indeed, creating a RTA enlarges the domestic market to the
aggregate size of all member countries.
National income is modeled in a pure exchange economy. It is positively related to
the ability of a country to trade, either inside its domestic or regional market or with the
rest of the world. Trade entails costs related to geographical, technological or political
14It states that if a coalition of player can reach higher payoffs in a given Nash equilibrium compared to
others, this equilibrium will prevail. Separately, each player should still not have incentives to deviate.
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obstacles. Trade costs are noted θ = (1− τ)(1− ϕ), where 0 ≤ τ < 1 represents physical
barriers to trade and 0 ≤ ϕ < 1 political trade barriers (tariffs, harmonization of rules and
standards...). θ is exogenous (θ = 1 means global free trade). When a RTA is created,
trade inside the regional market does not bear the latter costs (ϕRTA = 0). Countries are
assumed to trade with themselves. Hence, national income is defined by:
Yi = ϕ(1− τ)Si + (1− τ)(1− ϕ)SW (4)
where SW is the aggregate size of country’s i trading partners, including itself, and Si is the
size of its domestic market. Country size is normalized to 1, so that SW = 4 when peace
prevails, and Si = 1+φij . In this setting, trade is mutually beneficial. Since globalization
reduces transport costs, national income increases with globalization (larger θ).15
4 Equilibria
In line with empirical evidence of a large and persistent effect of war on bilateral trade
(Glick and Taylor, 2005; Martin et al., 2008), war is assumed to disrupt trade with op-
ponent.16 War thus reduces national income Yi because the country loses one trading
partner. From equation (4), it follows:
Cij =
{
(1− τ) if countries i and j belong to the same RTA
(1− τ)(1− ϕ) otherwise
(5)
The opportunity cost of war is thus larger inside a RTA than between countries that
are not members of the same agreement: C indij < C
RTA
ij . It follows from this result that the
probability that a dispute ends up in war is smaller inside a RTA than outside a RTA.
Noting piind = Pr(Eij > C indij ) and pi
RTA = Pr(Eij > CRTAij ), we have pi
ind > piRTA. A peaceful
resolution of disputes is thus more likely when the opponents belong to the same RTA.
Equilibrium defence spending and gains from appropriative activities can now be de-
rived for each configuration of RTAs. Country i’s government chooses its level of defence
spending to maximize the expected net return from conflict. We obtain:
di =
Rρ
4
(6)
Proof in appendix A.
The net expected return from conflict is defined as the net gains from appropriative
activities when a dispute occurs minus the appropriable income R. From equation (3), (5)
15Ruta (2005) shows that such a simple model of trade yields similar results than the model of trade in
intermediate goods developed by Alesina et al. (2000).
16Without loss of generality, direct war costs, which are assumed to be symmetric, are ignored.
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and (6), it equals for all countries j bordering country i:
Ri =
∑
j 6=i
Rij =
{ −ρ
4 (1− τ) [(1− ϕ)piind + piRTA] if country i belongs to a RTA
−ρ
2 pi
ind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) else
(7)
Regional integration thus affects income through two channels: trade and appropria-
tive activities. These gains from integration should exceed related heterogeneity costs.
Conditions under which regional integration will take place can now be derived. A RTA
will be created between country i and j (φij = 1) if they both strictly prefer regional
integration to independence, i.e. URTAi > U
ind
i and U
RTA
j > U
ind
j .
Proposition 1 For all kW < kE, we have in equilibrium:
• no RTA if and only if EGRI ≤ kW ,
• one RTA on the Western continent if and only if kW < EGRI ≤ kE,
• one RTA on each continent if and only if EGRI < kE,
where EGRI is the “expected gains from regional integration” and
EGRI =
ρ
4
(1− τ) [(piind − piRTA)(1− ϕ)− piRTAϕ] + (1− τ)ϕ. (8)
Proof in appendix A.
This proposition puts forward the intuitive result that equilibrium strategies of coun-
tries on each continent are to create RTAs when trade and conflict related gains from
regional integration outweigh the heterogeneity costs. Since heterogeneity costs of inte-
gration are larger on the Eastern continent, when kW < EGRI ≤ kE regional integration
takes place only among Western countries. When EGRI < kE , a RTA is formed on each
continent.
5 Expected gains from regional integration
The effect of the level of heterogeneity costs on incentives to create a RTA is clear-cut.
How international insecurity, ρ, and global trade openness, τ and ϕ, impact EGRI is less
straightforward. Interestingly, the effect of an increase in international insecurity (higher
ρ) will be contingent upon the pacifying effect of regional integration. When the gains
from reduced escalation to war probability under RTAs ((piind − piRTA)(1 − ϕ)) outweigh
the potential losses due to the larger opportunity cost of war (ϕpiRTA), an increase in
international insecurity will increase gains from integration and thus, everything else equal,
incentives to create a RTA. Otherwise, a more insecure world will decrease incentives to
create a RTA.
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Testable implication 1 “Expected gains from regional integration” increase in interna-
tional insecurity (∂EGRI∂ρ > 0) if regional integration reduces significantly dispute escalation
to war ((piind − piRTA)(1− ϕ) > ϕpiRTA). Otherwise, the opposite is true (∂EGRI∂ρ < 0).
The intuition behind is that in a more insecure world, countries would create a RTA
only if it favors the peaceful resolution of conflicts and offers a significant guarantee against
the risk of trade disruption related to war. A country will accept to be more dependent
on a partner only if the trade related gains from regional integration are not offset by the
larger potential cost of war. To the extent that different RTAs have different effects on
dispute escalation to war probabilities, dispute occurrence will affect differently incentives
to create each kind of RTAs.
Globalization also has an ambiguous effect on incentives to regional integration. On
the one hand, a decrease in political barriers to trade at the multilateral level (i.e. a
lower ϕ), such as tariffs cut under WTO, unambiguously reduces “expected gains from
regional integration”. It is worth noting that such channel of globalization, by preventing
the creation of RTAs, could increase the actual number of wars. Indeed, the probability
that an international war actually occurs is endogenous to the model, as it depends on the
configuration of the world. Let Ω be this probability; by definition we have:
Ω =
ρ
2
[φijpiRTA + (2− φij)piind] (9)
In fact, a reduced level of global political barriers to trade ϕ′ < ϕ, by preventing the
formation of RTAs (φ′ij = 0) could lead to a higher probability of observing an actual war,
Ω′ > Ω.
On the other hand, globalization through a decrease in physical barriers to trade af-
fects differently gains from regional integration. Again, if regional integration reduces
significantly the probability of dispute escalation to war ((piind − piRTA)(1 − ϕ) > ϕpiRTA),
then a decrease in physical barriers to trade unambiguously promotes regionalism, because
it increases gains from integration arising both from trade and conflicts. Otherwise, the
effect is lower or even negative, because conflict related gains from integration decrease in
τ .
Testable implication 2 Globalization through a decrease in physical barriers to trade
(lower τ) increases more strongly “expected gains from regional integration” when regional
integration reduces significantly the probability of dispute escalation to war ((piind−piRTA)(1−
ϕ) > ϕpiRTA).
The theoretical model above puts forward that the expected gains from regional inte-
gration differ according to the pacifying effect of RTAs, i.e. the relative level of piind and
piRTA. This in turn depends on the distribution of Eij and the value of political barriers
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to trade ϕ. As underlined in section II, the trade creating effect of different RTAs is sta-
tistically similar (Vicard, 2007; Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004); ϕ would thus be similar for
all RTAs. However, RTAs entailing the creation of a significant institutional framework,
such as customs unions and common markets, are likely to favor the peaceful resolution
of interstate conflicts and to reduce the likelihood of dispute escalation to war (Bearce,
2003; Bearce and Omori, 2005; Haftel, 2007). In the conflict game developed in this paper,
this pacifying effect goes through a reduction of the first-striker advantage. Supranational
institutions and regular meetings of high level officials indeed favor the exchange of infor-
mation on military capabilities and resolve, and thus limit the opportunity for a surprise
attack or increase the effectiveness of counter-attacks (Grossman, 2004b). So the institu-
tional features of RTAs matter for the distribution of Eij , thereby affecting the probability
of dispute escalation to war piij . The definition of the “depth” of regional trade integration
considered in section II relates the shape of economic integration and the design of the
institutional framework created. More integrated RTAs, such as customs unions and com-
mon markets, require a significant regional institutional framework, only able to promote
the peaceful resolution of disputes and to avoid the use of armed force to resolve conflicts,
i.e. to limit the first-striker advantage (Edeep RTAij < E
shallow RTA
ij ) and so to reduce further
the probability of dispute escalation to war under RTA, pideep RTAij = Pr(E
deep RTA
ij > C
RTA
ij ).
The effect of both trade openness and international insecurity on gains from creating a
RTA are found to be contingent on the ability of RTAs to significantly prevent disputes to
escalate into war. In this theoretical framework, RTAs may be differentiated according to
their ability to regulate interstate relations, and the choice to form a RTA with a partner
depends on the interplays between trade and security issues. Estimating determinants
of RTA creation defined in proposition 1 thus requires a preliminary step. We need first
to assess which kinds of RTAs actually reduce the likelihood of war occurrence, i.e. to
distinguish between deep and shallow RTAs. Then, we will be able to test the implications
1 and 2 of the theoretical model, by estimating the probability of RTA formation on these
two different samples of RTAs, that international insecurity ρ and trade globalization ϕ
are expected to affect differently.
IV Econometrics
In this section, I test empirically implications (1) and (2) of the theoretical model, which
suggest that the likelihood to create a RTA between two countries are:
• positively related to the propensity to interstate disputes concerning deep RTA;
• negatively related to the propensity to interstate disputes concerning shallow RTA;
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• negatively related to the level of physical barriers to trade concerning deep RTA, but
less so or even positively for shallow RTA.
Though, we need first to investigate the effect of different kinds of RTAs on the likelihood
of war occurrence.
1 Data
Data on RTAs have been assembled from notifications to the WTO under article XXIV of
GATT or the Enabling Clause for developing countries17, Frankel (1997), Foroutan (1993,
1998), Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990), Machlup (1977) and other public sources. I
consider all regional (i.e. three or more parties) trade agreements which take the form of
Preferential Trade Arrangements (PA), Free Trade Areas (FTA), Customs Unions (CU), or
Common markets (CM)18, in force at least one year between 1950 and 2000. Non reciprocal
agreements are thus excluded. Bilateral agreements are also considered separately for
two reasons: their institutional framework is limited and likely to differ from regional
agreements, and it is difficult to compute all bilateral agreements and especially their
depth on a long time span as ours.19 Reliable data are more comprehensively available for
recent years, so that I also compute membership in bilateral RTAs for the year 2000 for
robustness analysis. Unless otherwise mentioned in our sources, an agreement is assumed
to be in force at the date defined in the treaty and, if not available, once the agreement has
been signed and ratified. It should, however, be noted that this does not necessarily mean
that all provisions of the agreement have been fully implemented. Membership in RTAs
is defined by dummy variables coded 1 when both countries in the dyad are members of
the same RTA during the year considered. Deep RTAs aggregates CM and CU; they are
those involving a more complete political integration and the provision of public goods in
common. Our data set reports 49 RTAs over the period 1950-2000, of which 17 are coded
as PAs, 13 FTAs, 17 CUs and 2 CMs (see Appendix B1 for a detailed list).
The occurrence of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) between two states is coded
from the COW database (Faten et al., 2004) which reports all interstates disputes involving
the use of armed force on a yearly basis since 1816. The COW project defines a war as
a MID involving at least 1000 deaths of military personnel. This restrictive definition
dramatically reduces the number of events considered as war, and prevents any robust
17http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
18Based on WTO, a PA is defined as an agreement among three or more parties in which reciprocal
preferences are exchanged to cover a limited range of the parties’ trade in goods (partial in scope); a FTA
is defined as an agreement among three or more parties in which reciprocal preferences are exchanged to
cover a large spectrum of the parties’ trade in goods; a CU is defined as a RTA with a common external tariff
in addition to the exchange of trade preferences; and a CM is defined as a RTA allowing free movements
of factors (goods, capital and workers).
19Exceptions are the inclusion of the CU between the EU and Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, and the CU
between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the Closer Economic Relations agreement between Australia
and New-Zealand.
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empirical analysis. I follow the literature and use a broader definition of war including
armed conflicts involving the display or the use of armed force, i.e. a MID of hostility level
3 (display of force), 4 (use of force) or 5 (war) in the COW database.20
The qualitative data provided by databases on armed conflicts, such as the COW
database above, imply that the actors, the duration, the geographical location and the
intensity of each conflict have been defined by researchers. Thus, only rare events such as
wars can be considered. But to assess the dispute initiation process, we need to measure
conflicts of lower intensity, not reported in such data sets. An alternative type of data is
available: events data which account for a broader range of interstates relations. Events
data are reported, by trained students or automatically by computers, on a day by day
basis from newspapers or wire services and coded by actor, target, as well as action form
and date. Data on daily events have the great advantage of providing information what-
ever the intensity of the underlying event. In comparison with armed conflict databases,
if assessing the evolution of a given conflict is hardly feasible, such data enable to measure
the occurrence of a dispute between two countries every year, which is what we need.
Events data compiled by Kinsella and Russett (2002) are used to measure the occurrence
of a dispute exceeding a certain threshold defined as strong verbal hostility.21 They over-
lap data from three events databases, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), the
World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Protocol for the Assessment of Nonvio-
lent Direct Action (PANDA), to construct a dummy variable coded 1 if a dispute occurs
for any dyad-year over the 1950-1992 period.22 Table 2 provides event categories coded as
disputes and their equivalent on the widely used Goldstein (1992) scale, which rates events
between -10 and +10 according to the level of conflict or cooperation they embed. Only
events classified at least as conflictual as categories ”Cancel or postpone planned events”
and ”Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove” are coded as a dispute. Out of the 127259
dyad-years of our sample, 7884 experience a dispute, of which 584 spillover into MID.
Trade data come from the database assembled by Katherine Barbieri23, who uses
mostly information from the IMF and the League of Nations international trade statistics,
and completed by Martin et al. (2008) using the IMF DOTS database. Income data also
comes from Martin et al. (2008), and are assembled from the Penn World Table (version
6.2), Katherine Barbieri’s database and the World Bank WDI database. Geographic and
20MIDs of hostility level 2 (threat to use force) are excluded. See the COW website (http://www.
correlatesofwar.org/) for more information and records of MIDs.
21See Kinsella and Russett (2002, p.1054-1055) for more details on databases used and the operationaliz-
ing of the minimum conflict intensity threshold. Using disputes exceeding a certain intensity in our analysis
limits the biases related to the use of event data (Schrodt and Gerner, 2000).
22189 cases exhibit a MID but no dispute. I follow Kinsella and Russett (2002) and treat them as
measurement errors, due to the fact that events data sets rely on major news media and do not cover
accordingly all regions of the world. The dummy variable is thus recoded as if a dispute occurred.
23See http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/site/k5vj7G/new_page_builder_4
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Table 2: Events and Goldstein scale
Event category Goldstein
Request action; call for -0,1
Explicit decline to comment -0,1
Urge or suggest action or policy -0,1
Comment on situation -0,2
Deny an accusation -0,9
Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position -1,1
Grant asylum -1,1
Make complaint (not formal) -1,9
Cancel or postpone planned events -2,2
Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove -2,2
Issue formal complaint or protest -2,4
Give warning -3
Denounce; denigrate; abuse -3,4
Halt negotiation -3,8
Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat -4
Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow -4
Reduce routine international activity; recall officials -4,1
Detain or arrest person(s) -4,4
Threat without specific negative sanction stated -4,4
Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance -4,9
Expel organization or group -4,9
Order person or personnel out of country -5
Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on -5,2
Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive -5,6
Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction -5,8
Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit -6,9
Threat with force specified -7
Break diplomatic relations -7
Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup -7,6
Noninjury destructive action -8,3
Nonmilitary destruction/injury -8,7
Seize position or possessions -9,2
Military attack; clash; assault -10
Source: Goldstein (1992)
colonial data are from the CEPII24. Tariff data are assembled by Gwartney et al. (2005)
from World Bank (Various issues) and other sources25. Data on national material capa-
bilities and formal defence alliances are taken from the COW project26. The composite
democracy indicator is taken from Polity IV27. It measures openness/closedness of political
institutions on a -10 / +10 scale (10 means high democracy). Finally, UN vote correlation
is taken from “The Affinity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in the UN
General Assembly” computed by Erik Gartzke.
2 The effect of regionalism on war
2.1 Econometric model
The preliminary step of this empirical analysis is to investigate the effect of the different
kinds of RTAs on dispute resolution. As explicitly modeled in the theoretical section,
the outbreak of a war results from a two-stage process, the initiation of a dispute and
24http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
25See http://www.freetheworld.com for details.
26http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
27http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/
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its escalation to war. A war cannot occur unless a dispute arises beforehand. The final
observed outcome, i.e. the occurrence of a war between two countries i and j, actually has
two components:
Pr(warij) = Pr(disputeij)× Pr(escalationij | disputeij) (10)
The value of interest in this paper is the second component of the right-hand side equation,
i.e. the probability of escalation to war when a dispute arises (pi in the theoretical model).
Using a simple probit or logit model to estimate the conditional probability of war would
thus yield results subject to a selection bias, because it cannot account for dispute initia-
tion. The probability of existence of a dispute between two countries (ρ in the theoretical
model) have to be taken into account. Once a conflict emerges, it is likely that the process
driving its evolution greatly differs from the one explaining its initiation. Different factors
could therefore have different impacts depending on the stage of the conflict process. For
instance, neighboring countries are likely to face more disputes and also to be more prone
to escalate them to war, because sharing a common border makes the use of armed force
easier. Using a wide definition of conflicts, including diplomatic and economic disputes,
Kinsella and Russett (2002) show that determinants of conflict onset and escalation differ
and that the effect of some of them are nonmonotonic on the whole range of the conflict
process.
Moreover selection effects have to be modeled because the escalation process is ob-
served only if a dispute occurred. Unobserved variables, such as commitment, resolve or
willingness to take risks, could therefore affect differently the processes of escalation and
initiation, or could be disclosed at different stages of the conflict process. As Fearon (1995)
emphasizes, asymmetries of information are particularly relevant for explaining war occur-
rence. The state leaders enter disputes with few information on opponent’s commitment or
resolve. But this information is disclosed along the conflict process and could therefore in-
fluence the later stages. The degree of asymmetric information therefore differs according
to the stage of the conflict process. And information disclosed when a dispute is initiated
is likely to influence its escalation process.
Using a bivariate probit with censoring is thus a natural econometric model to estimate
the probability of war for each dyad-year. It allows to jointly model the dispute initiation
and its escalation to war and to account for the impact of each factor on different stages
of the conflict process and of the censoring of the dependent variable. The log-likelihood
function is based on the unconditional probabilities associated with the three possible
outcomes (Greene, 2003, p.713): no dispute (dispute = 0), a dispute emerges but does not
escalate to war (dispute = 1 and war = 0), and the dispute escalates into war (dispute = 1
and war = 1). Two equations are jointly estimated, one explaining the dispute initiation
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and the second the dispute escalation to war. Consider y1 and y2, two latent (unobserved)
variables, representing the difference in utility levels from dispute initiation and dispute
escalation to war respectively. The model estimated is derived from a standard bivariate
probit model:
y1 = β1X1 + ²1 and dispute =
{
1 if y1 > 0
0 if y1 ≤ 0
y2 = β2X2 + ²2 and war =
{
1 if y2 > 0
0 if y2 ≤ 0
(11)
where X1,2 are vectors of explanatory variables, β1,2 vectors of parameters, and errors
terms ²1 and ²2 are assumed to be independent from X1,2 and to follow E(²1) = E(²2) =
0, V ar(²1) = V ar(²2) = 1, and Cov[²1, ²2] = %.
Wooldridge (2002, p.564) emphasizes that, technically, the coefficients can be identified
due only to the nonlinearity of the two equations in the bivariate probit. Hence, it is not
necessary for X2 to be a strict subset of X1 for the outcome equation to be identified.
However, the identification of the parameters of the model is better handled when X1
contains at least one variable that is not in X2, so that we have an exclusion restriction,
i.e. a variable that influences the selection equation but not the outcome equation. The
number of landlocked countries in a dyad is a good candidate as an identification variable,
because it reduces the likelihood for two countries to experience any interaction, and in
particular disputes, but there is no reason to believe that being landlocked affect the way
conflicts are settled, peacefully or through war.28
All specifications control for autocorrelation by clustering the bivariate censored probit
at the dyadic level.
2.2 Econometric results
Studies of war have put forward various determinants of war, related to history, military
technology, geography, and economic and political relations. A number of control variable
are thus considered in the empirical analysis, in order to account for any variable affecting
at the same time war occurrence and RTA membership. Geography is a major determinant
of conflict occurrence, both onset or escalation, as well as of the choice of RTA partners
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). The history of war has also been found to be an important
determinant of current interstate relations (Beck et al., 1998) so, as is common in the
literature, the number of peaceful years within the dyad is included. Three controls for
trade relations are added: a proxy for bilateral trade interdependence (the log of the mean
28When introduced in a probit model of the second stage equation, the number of landlocked countries
is not statistically significant.
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of bilateral imports in percentage of GDP), and another for multilateral trade dependence
(the log of the mean of multilateral (excluding bilateral) imports in percentage of GDP),
as well as a dummy for dyad experiencing zero trade flows (both exports and imports),
as a control for fixed trade costs. It allows to account for any impact of RTAs on the
geography of trade, as it has been argued that bilateral trade reduces the likelihood of war
whereas multilateral trade dampens this relation (Martin et al., 2008). In order to remove
the potential contemporaneous effect of war on bilateral and multilateral trade, trade
variables are lagged 4 years.29 In addition, controls for cultural, historical and diplomatic
affinities between countries are included. These are dummies for pairs of countries sharing
a common language, ever in a colonial relationship or with a common colonizer, and the
UN general assembly vote correlation (lagged 4 years). Countries sharing affinities are
more likely to be part of the same RTA, to trade more and to be less warlike, whereas
countries sharing common colonial history would exhibit more unresolved conflict issues.
The sum of democracy indexes is also included in our specification because it has been
shown that democracies are less likely to wage wars (see Levy and Razin (2004) and
Jackson and Massimo (2007) for a theoretical treatment, and Oneal and Russett (1997)
among others for empirical evidence), but it has also been argued that democracy affect
the choice to create a RTA (Mansfield et al., 2002), so that its omission could bias our
results. Moreover, a proxy for country size, - a bigger territory is more difficult to defend
and is exposed to more opponents, but a big country is also less open to trade and is
particular with respect to regional integration, as it often implies asymmetric integration
-, and a dummy for countries sharing a common defence alliance are included. Finally,
year dummies are added to control for any chock affecting all dyads in the same year.
It is worth noting that when all these controls are added, the Wald test of independent
equation is no longer significant so that the two equation simultaneously estimated are
independent.30
Results are presented in table 3. They show that the institutional variation in RTAs
matter concerning their effects on the way interstates conflicts are settled. Joint member-
ship in a customs union or a common market promotes the peaceful resolution of disputes
whereas membership in other RTAs does not affect the dispute escalation to war process
per se. This effect is sizeable. Figure 2 plots the conditional (on selection) predicted prob-
ability of war (Pr(war = 1|dispute = 1)) for different values of some key determinants of
29Martin et al. (2008) show that a 4-years lag is enough to remove any contemporaneous reverse effect of
war on trade. RTA membership is obviously not affected by any contemporaneous effect of military conflict,
because it takes time to negotiate and implement an agreement. Using panel fixed effect or instrumental
variable econometric models to control for endogeneity potentially arising from omitted variables likely to
affect simultaneously war and RTA membership is not possible here because too few dyads enter both war
and RTA over our time period and exogenous determinants of RTA membership are not available.
30It is however not the case when only basic determinants of war are included. See Vicard (2008) for
additional robustness analysis.
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Table 3: Impact of RTAs on war: bivariate censored probit model
Equation: Escalation Initiation
Dependent variable: MID Dispute
Deep RTA membership -0.57b 0.10
(0.28) (0.10)
FTA membership 0.25 -0.24
(0.28) (0.15)
PA membership -0.01 -0.00
(0.14) (0.07)
Nbr. of peaceful years -0.01a -0.00a
(0.00) (0.00)
Log distance -0.06 -0.32a
(0.11) (0.02)
Contiguity dum. 0.56a 0.30a
(0.18) (0.07)
Bil. trade dependence (t-4) 0.38 1.68a
(0.57) (0.23)
Multil. trade dependence (t-4) 0.21c -0.30a
(0.12) (0.05)
Zero trade dum. (t-4) 0.09 -0.21a
(0.18) (0.03)
Common language dum. -0.29a 0.16a
(0.10) (0.04)
Colonial relationship dum. -0.19 0.54a
(0.23) (0.09)
Common colonizer dum. 0.07 0.10c
(0.13) (0.06)
Sum of democracy indexes -0.41a 0.23a
(0.08) (0.03)
Common defence alliance dum. -0.31 0.47a
(0.19) (0.06)
Log area -0.01 0.12a
(0.05) (0.01)
UN vote correlation (t-4) 0.30 -0.99a
(0.35) (0.05)
Nbr. Of landlocked dum. -0.22a
(0.03)
Observations 127259
Uncensored Obs. 7884
Log likelihood -23308.5
Rho (Wald test of independent eqn.) -0.26
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup
correlation in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Intercept and time
dummies not reported.
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war (unless otherwise mentioned, variables are held at their mean). Joint membership in
a deep RTA reduces the predicted probability that a dispute escalate into war by almost
two third.31 This peace externality is also sizeable in comparison with the effect of other
determinants of war. It is equivalent to increasing the number of peaceful years between
two countries by 28 years from its mean value; and it is twice larger than the effect of shar-
ing a common language or a common defense alliance, or increasing the sum of democracy
indexes by one standard deviation from the mean.
Figure 2: Conditional (on selection) predicted probabilities
These results confirm that only the institutional framework provided by deep RTAs
significantly reduces the likelihood that a dispute escalate into war. Two categories of
agreements can thus be distinguished according to their ability to prevent dispute es-
calation to war: deep RTAs (customs unions and common markets) provide significant
security externality whereas shallow agreements (preferential agreements and free trade
agreements) do not.
3 The formation of Regional Trade Agreements
Having defined the different categories of RTAs, their determinants can now be investi-
gated. Proposition 1 relates the formation of RTAs to international insecurity, physical
and political barriers to trade, and the heterogeneity costs of integration, i.e. geographical
as well as cultural proximity of countries. Based on the theoretical model, I estimate the
31It reduces the predicted probabilities that a dispute escalate into war by 8,8 percentage points (1,9
percentage points ) for contiguous and trading countries separated by 1000km and not member of any RTA
(resp. countries not member of any RTA), from a baseline predicted probability of 13.6% (2,5%).
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probability of RTA formation between two countries i and j at time t using a probit model:
Pr(RTAijt = 1) = β0 + β1 ρijt + β2 τijt + β3 Controlsijt + ²ijt (12)
Equation 12 is estimated separately for deep and shallow RTAs. From, implications
(1) and (2), we expect β1 > 0 for deep RTAs and β1 < 0 for shallow RTAs, and β2 > 0 for
deep RTAs and βshallow2 < β
deep
2 .
Events data described above are used to compute a proxy for dispute propensity. The
interstate dispute variable is defined as the dispute propensity between countries i and j
over a 10 years period, lagged nine years to both prevent any simultaneity bias and take
into account the time needed to negotiate an agreement. Physical barriers to trade are
approximated by the average of multilateral trade (exports plus imports minus bilateral
trade flows) as a share of GDP, as a proxy for the natural trade openness related to
countries’ market access.
As Baier and Bergstrand (2004) underline, endogeneity should be considered in our
modeling strategy, because past RTA membership could impact the current economic
fundamentals of members. To deal with this endogeneity issue, two strategies are imple-
mented.
• Concerning the proxy for dispute propensity, I estimate an IV probit model, where
dispute occurrence is determined endogenously, thanks to the use of exogenous in-
strumental variables.32 Theory in international relations gives us exogenous instru-
mental variables: the ratio of national material capabilities (i.e. the ratio of the
lower to the higher capability index) and the major power status of countries in the
dyad are highly correlated to dispute occurrence but not directly related to RTA
membership. The former indicator is compiled by the COW project from six indi-
cators: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel
production, urban population, and total population. It is commonly used in political
science to assess the relative national military capabilities.33
• Multilateral trade openness is also likely to be affected by past RTA membership.
However, no appropriate instrumental variables are available, because standard geo-
graphical determinants of trade openness also affect RTA formation. So the variable
measuring the natural openness of countries is lagged in 1960 to remote any effect of
past RTA membership on current openness. The inclusion of year dummies controls
for any global reduction of physical barriers to trade over time and any variation in
32Another advantage of using an IV econometric model is that it also deals with measurement error of
the endogenous explanatory variable, which is, as explained above, also valuable in our case. For instance,
institutions under deep RTAs are likely to publicize disputes, creating a downward bias on the coefficient
of dispute propensity in the deep regionalism case.
33More information is available from COW website: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
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global tariffs. Likewise, all variables including the GDPs (similarity of income per
capita, average GDPs and difference of GDPs) are also lagged in 1960. This reduces
the sample of countries, because several countries were not independent in 1960.
The probability of RTA between two countries is estimated every five years between
1980 and 2000. Because the traditional Sargan test is not applicable in our econometric
specification, a Smith-Blundell test (with the probexog program) and a Wald test of exo-
geneity are implemented to test for the exogeneity of our model and the relevance of our
two stages IV probit econometric specification. Both strongly confirm the need to account
for endogeneity (first stage estimates are provided in appendix C).
3.1 Results
Results are reported in table 4. It first presents results including only controls directly
derived from proposition 1 of the theoretical model. Heterogeneity costs are related to
geographical, cultural and historical proximity; it is approximated first by the distance
between the most populated cities of the two countries and common border for its geo-
graphic part, and income level similarity (the log of the difference of income per capita)
and dummies for common language and common colonizer for its cultural and historical
part. Finally, year dummies are included to control for any overall co-evolution over time
of RTA membership, interstate disputes and national trade openness, and in particular for
the variation of global political impediments to trade.
For the sake of completeness, specifications (1) and (2) report the results of simple
probit estimations for, respectively, pooled RTAs and when deep and shallow RTAs are
differentiated. Specification (3) presents estimation results when dispute propensity is
instrumented in order to account for endogeneity. Dispute propensity is then found to be
significantly and strongly negatively associated to shallow RTAs and positively to deep
RTAs, in accordance with our theoretical model. Countries experiencing lots of interstate
disputes will agree to enter a RTA, and thus accept greater dependence on a given trading
partner, only if it also creates institutions reducing the risks of trade disruption and
securing the gains from trade. On the other hand, shallow agreements are created between
countries whose trade relationship is not threatened by interstate conflicts. Comparison
with specification (2), in which the dispute propensity variable is not instrumented, points
out that endogeneity biases the estimated coefficient downward for both shallow and deep
RTAs. The coefficients are nevertheless significant and exhibit the expected sign in this
specification.
In addition, the level of physical barriers to trade also has a different effect according to
the kind of RTA created. Countries naturally more open to trade are more likely to create
deep RTAs, whereas the opposite is true concerning shallow RTAs. Pairs of countries more
24
integrated to the world trading system, i.e. facing less physical impediments to trade, have
the incentive to create RTAs involving a large institutional framework. This result is a
continuation, at the international level, of what North (1990, p.34) put forward regarding
domestic institutions and exchange: ”the greater the specialization and the number and
variability of valuable attributes, the more weight must be put on reliable institutions that
allow individuals to engage in complex contracting with a minimum of uncertainty about
whether the terms of the contract can be realized”. By providing a broad supranational
institutional framework, deep regionalism allows member countries to be more dependent
on international trade. On the other hand, remote countries, which face more barriers to
trade and are naturally less integrated to the world trading system, tend to form shallow
RTAs.
Table 4: Probability of a RTA between two countries
Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: all Shallow Deep Shallow Deep Shallow Deep
RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs
Propensity to dispute -0.30b -0.57a 0.81a -3.33a 3.15a -5.46a 2.95a
(0.15) (0.18) (0.29) (0.33) (0.44) (0.35) (0.90)
Multi. trade (1960) -0.10 -0.26a 1.04a -0.52a 1.33a -0.29a 1.50a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) (0.20) (0.08) (0.29)
Log distance -0.33a -0.08c -1.27a -0.16a -1.07a -0.03 -0.95a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11)
Contiguity dum. 0.64a 0.74a -0.25 1.15a -0.60a 1.40a -0.34
(0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.26)
Diff. GDP per capita (1960) -0.19a -0.20a -0.02 -0.12a -0.05 -0.07a -0.10c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
Common language dum. 0.04 0.22b -0.72a 0.30a -0.72a 0.15c -0.70a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.21) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.20)
Common colonizer dum. -0.28b -0.17 0.02 -0.19 0.11 0.29b 1.47a
(0.14) (0.15) (0.26) (0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.33)
Multi. tariffs -0.08a -0.13a
(0.01) (0.02)
Avg. GDP (1960) 0.48a -0.19
(0.04) (0.13)
Diff. GDP (1960) -0.18a 0.14c
(0.03) (0.08)
Sum of democracy indexes -0.43a 2.36a
(0.06) (0.33)
Common defence alliance dum. 0.85a 0.49a
(0.10) (0.18)
Observations 13262 13262 13262 13262 13262 11698 11698
Log pseudolikelihood -4106.4 -3764.4 -658.3 2959.2 6018.0 3136.8 5736.0
Wald test of exogeneity - - - 54.0a 28.2a 56.2a 7.2a
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity - - - 118.0a 77.4a 152.0a 19.1a
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses. a, b and c
respectively denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time dummies and
intercept are not reported.
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In specification (4), I add a number of control variables, likely to affect at the same
time RTA membership, dispute propensity and trade openness. I first include a proxy for
global tariffs, the most visible political barriers to trade, measured by the average tariffs
level for a sample of 28 countries34. It is exogenous to the dyad, so it is not affected by past
RTA membership. I then control for the economic size of partner countries, by including
the average GDP of countries in the dyad and the absolute difference in GDPs. While
gains from economic integration are likely to be driven by the size of the partner’s market,
extensive empirical evidence suggest size determines national openness to trade. Finally,
a proxy for the level of democracy and a dummy variable for countries sharing a common
defence alliance are added. Some empirical evidences show that more democratic countries
are more likely to create RTAs (Mansfield et al., 2002). On the other side, democratic
status is also likely to affect dispute occurrence. Its omission could thus bias results. In
addition, it is likely that citizens from democratic countries share common preferences,
which reduces heterogeneity costs of political integration.
Control variables globally exhibit the expected sign. Any form of regionalism is de-
terred by heterogeneity among countries. More distant countries, as well as countries
whose income level is dissimilar, are significantly less likely to form any RTAs, whereas
adjacency increases the likelihood of creation of shallow RTAs. Geographic proximity
therefore seems to be captured by distance for deep RTAs, and by the common border
dummy for shallow RTAs. Sharing a common colonizer or a common defence alliance also
promotes all kinds of regional integration. Sharing a common official primary language
favors the creation of shallow RTAs, but it is surprisingly negatively related to the proba-
bility to form a deep RTAs. Regarding the democratic status, dyads exhibiting on average
more democratic institutions have a higher probability to form a deep RTA, whereas shal-
low RTAs are less likely in democratic dyads. Disentangling different forms of regionalism
is thus particularly important to understand how domestic institutions affect the forma-
tion of such international agreements. This result seems logical in the sense that entering
a deep RTA involves to share some common supranational institutions or public goods. To
give up such a part of the national sovereignty is possible only between similar countries in
terms of political system, type of government and origin of the legitimacy. This constraint
is less binding concerning shallow RTAs, in which more autocratic regimes can retain more
independent power while benefiting from gains from trade. The average multilateral tariff
level is negatively related to both deep and shallow RTA formation, but more strongly
with the former. Interestingly, the size distribution of partner countries seems to drive
differently shallow and deep RTAs. The larger and the more similar countries are, the
34Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States.
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larger the likelihood to create a shallow RTA, which suggest that their formation is driven
by market access. On the contrary, the economic size of countries does not affect the
formation of deep RTAs, but dissimilarity in income foster deep regionalism. It suggests
again that deep regionalism is motivated by regulation of interstate relations, which is
particularly relevant concerning dissimilar countries.
Controlling for these additional determinants of the formation of RTAs does not alter
the main results. In this complete (and preferred) specification, the results strongly, and
significantly at the 1% level, confirm the theoretical predictions: countries more subject
to interstate disputes and naturally more opened to trade create deep RTAs, whereas the
opposite is true concerning shallow RTAs.
3.2 Robustness analysis
In order to check the robustness of the results, I estimate several alternative specifications
of the model. First, to test for any sample bias due to the presence of the EU member
countries, which belong to Western Europe, an historically particularly integrated region,
the preferred specification (4) is re-estimated on a restricted sample, excluding Western
European country pairs. Results are presented in the first columns of table 5. Our main
results remain qualitatively unchanged. In the deep RTA case, the significance of the coef-
ficient on dispute propensity is however reduced, which arises because excluding Western
European country pairs largely reduces the number of dyads member of a deep RTAs.
Hence, our results are robust to the exclusion of Western Europe, the historically and
geographically most integrated region of the world.
The sample is then restricted to the year 2000. This specification is thus closer to the
model estimated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), focusing on cross-country variation in
RTA membership. The time variation in RTA membership is not accounted for, and the
evolution of global tariffs is hence not included in the model. The instrumented variable,
dispute propensity, is computed over the whole period. Specification (6) in table 5 presents
the results. Overall, results are consistent with previous findings. Dispute propensity again
affects strongly and negatively shallow regionalism but positively deep regionalism, with
coefficients significant at the 1% level. However, lagged trade openness is found to strongly
foster the formation of deep as well as shallow RTAs. In this specification, lagged trade
openness is a proxy for both natural openness to trade and the degree of liberalization
of the world trade system. As in preceding specifications, this effect is however stronger
for deep than for shallow regionalism. Coefficients on other control variables remains
qualitatively similar.
Finally, the definition of RTAs used so far could induce a selection bias, because it
restricts the sample of agreements included in the dependent variable. Specification (6)
is re-estimated using a wider definition of trade agreements, including all bilateral trade
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agreements (see appendix B for a list of bilateral agreements included). The inclusion of
this variable was impossible before because, according to the initial definition of RTAs
adopted in this paper, no such country pairs entered a regional agreement. Results, pro-
vided in specification (7) in table 5, confirm previous findings. Results are thus robust
to alternative definition of the dependent variable, such as a wider definition of trade
agreements adopted in specification (7).
Table 5: Probability of a RTA between two countries (IV Probit)
Western European
dyads excluded
Year 2000
Year 2000 and
bil. RTAs
Model: (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Shallow Deep Shallow Deep Shallow Deep
RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs
Propensity to dispute -5.58a 2.01c -10.05a 4.61a -7.48a 4.61a
(0.34) (1.18) (0.63) (1.34) (0.73) (1.34)
Multi. Trade (1960) 0.48a 0.59c 0.29a 0.75a 0.79a 0.75a
(0.04) (0.33) (0.08) (0.22) (0.04) (0.22)
Multi. Tariffs -0.05a -0.13a
(0.01) (0.02)
ln distance -0.07 -0.59a 0.06 -0.93a -0.41a -0.93a
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
Contiguity dum. 1.51a 0.07 1.31a -0.16 0.75a -0.16
(0.23) (0.38) (0.21) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26)
Diff. GDP per capita (1960) -0.08a 0.01 -0.15a 0.08 -0.21a 0.08
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Common language dum. 0.16b -0.51b 0.24a -0.49a -0.00 -0.49a
(0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.19) (0.09) (0.19)
Common colonizer dum. 0.27b 1.30a 0.09 2.05a -0.20 2.05a
(0.13) (0.27) (0.13) (0.28) (0.15) (0.28)
Avg. GDP (1960) -0.17a -0.24b 0.59a -0.20c -0.32a -0.20c
(0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11)
Diff. GDP (1960) -0.25a 0.03 -0.20a 0.02 0.58a 0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Sum of democracy indexes -0.30a 1.84a -0.43a 2.14a -0.14b 2.14a
(0.05) (0.31) (0.07) (0.31) (0.07) (0.31)
Common defence alliance dum. 0.82a 0.59a 0.74a 0.43a 0.50a 0.43a
(0.12) (0.22) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)
Observations 11200 11200 3347 3347 3347 3347
Log pseudolikelihood 3098.7 5875.9 2631.1 3580.2 2312.0 3580.2
Wald test of exogeneity 60.7a 4.1b 72.7a 9.9a 55.0a 9.9a
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity 152.0a 19.1a 81.3a 7.8a 61.0a 7.8a
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses. a, b and
c respectively denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Intercept not reported.
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V Conclusion
This paper is the first to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, why RTAs take
different forms around the world. By introducing simultaneously military and trade is-
sues in a model of political integration, this paper sheds light on the interplays between
security and economic forces in the formation of RTAs. It puts forward that defining the
depth of regional integration in relation with the level of political integration it entails is
necessary to understand the determinants of the shapes of regionalism. Results emphasize
that different kinds of RTAs have different determinants. Countries more subject to in-
terstate disputes and naturally more opened to trade are more likely to create politically
integrated regional agreements, such as common markets or customs unions. On the con-
trary, international insecurity deters the formation of less integrated agreements implying
a weak institutional framework, such as preferential or free trade agreements. Besides
their potential effect on trade, analyzing RTAs as regulating institutions in a world where
no supranational institution enforces property rights is therefore particularly relevant. In
order to remain sustainable, a greater national openness to trade, and thus a greater de-
pendence on trading partners, requires guarantees on the continuity of access to world
markets, i.e. that interstates conflicts would not lead to the disruption of economic flows.
Such regulation is typically the purpose of institutions such as those created under the
more integrated RTAs.
These results have important implications concerning the nexus between multilateral-
ism and regionalism. Indeed, the positive security externality of deep RTAs highlighted in
this paper suggests that institutions created along with regional integration are a prereq-
uisite to market integration, which could doubtfully be provided at the multilateral level.
Regionalism and multilateralism would therefore be complementary as far as the former
encourages countries to put less emphasis on matters of security and to be more dependent
on international trade.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Defence spending:
Each country chooses its level of defence spending while taking into account defence spend-
ing of its potential opponents, its neighbors. Thus, without RTAs, the Nash equilibrium
defence spending are:
d∗1 = max
d1
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d1
d1 + d∗2
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d1
d1 + d∗4
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d1
}
d∗2 = max
d2
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d2
d2 + d∗1
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d2
d2 + d∗3
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d2
}
d∗3 = max
d3
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d3
d3 + d∗2
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d3
d3 + d∗4
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d3
}
d∗4 = max
d4
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d4
d4 + d∗1
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d4
d4 + d∗3
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d4
}
whose first order conditions give:
d2
(d1 + d2)2
+
d4
(d1 + d4)2
=
d1
(d2 + d1)2
+
d3
(d2 + d3)2
=
d4
(d3 + d4)2
+
d2
(d3 + d2)2
=
d1
(d4 + d1)2
+
d3
(d4 + d3)2
=
2
ρR
The solution is:
d∗1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗
3 = d
∗
4 =
ρR
4
With one RTA35, the Nash equilibrium defence spending are defined by:
d∗1 =max
d1
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d1
d1 + d∗2
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d1
d1 + d∗4
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d1
}
d∗2 =max
d2
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d2
d2 + d∗1
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d2
d2 + d∗3
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d2
}
d∗3 =max
d3
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d3
d3 + d∗2
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d3
d3 + d∗4
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d3
}
d∗4 =max
d4
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d4
d4 + d∗3
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ) + 2R d4
d4 + d∗1
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d4
}
The solution is:
d∗1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗
3 = d
∗
4 =
ρR
4
35I assume kW < kE ; the Western continent is then the first to create a RTA.
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Finally, with two RTAs, the Nash equilibrium defence spending are defined by:
d∗1 = max
d1
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d1
d1 + d∗2
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d1
d1 + d∗4
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d1
}
d∗2 = max
d2
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d2
d2 + d∗1
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d2
d2 + d∗3
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d2
}
d∗3 = max
d3
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d3
d3 + d∗4
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d3
d3 + d∗2
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d3
}
d∗4 = max
d4
{
ρ
4
[
2R
d4
d4 + d∗3
− piRTA(1− τ) + 2R d4
d4 + d∗1
− piind(1− τ)(1− ϕ)−R
]
− d4
}
The solution is again:
d∗1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗
3 = d
∗
4 =
ρR
4
The decision to form a RTA:
Regional integration is strictly preferred to independence if URTA > U ind. From equation
1, we know that gains from regional integration arise from 3 sources: market size, conflict
and relative defence spending. Those “expected gains from regional integration” (EGRI)
should outweigh the heterogeneity costs from integration ki, such that:
EGRI > ki where EGRI = (Y RTAi − Y indi ) + (RRTAi − Rindi )− (dRTAi − dindi )
Substituting together with equation equation (4), (6) and (7), the “expected gains from
regional integration” equal:
EGRI =
ρ
4
(1− τ) [(piind − piRTA)(1− ϕ)− piRTAϕ] + (1− τ)ϕ
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Appendix B: Regional Trade Agreements
Common Markets Political agreements
Benelux 1961 European Coal and Steel Community 1952-1957
European Union (EU) 1992 Regional Cooperation for Development 1965-1979
Arab Maghreb Union 1989
Custom Unions South African Development 1980-1999
Coordination Conference
Benelux 1947-1960 Cross Border Initiative 26 1990
European Communities 1958-1991 Association of South East Asian Nations 1967
Equatorial Customs Union 1959-1965 South Asian Association for Regional 1985
Custom Union of West African States 1960-1966 Co-operation
East African Community 1967-1977 Asian Pacific Cooperation (APEC) 1989
Custom Union EU-Malta 1971
Custom Union EU-Cyprus 1973 Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
Mano River Union 1973
Caribbean Community and Common Market 1973 EU-Norway 1973
(CARICOM) EU -Switzerland 1973
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 1991 EU -Egypt 1977
Custom Union Czech Republic-Slovakia 1993 United States of America -Israel 1985
Central American Common Market 1993 EU -Czech Republic 1992
Economic and Monetary Community 1994 EU -Hungary 1992
of Central Africa EU -Poland 1992
Andean Custom Union 1995 EFTA -Czech Republic 1992
Custom Union EU-Turkey 1996 EFTA -Turkey 1992
Eurasian Economic Community 1997 EU -Romania 1993
West African Economic and Monetary Union 1998 EFTA -Bulgaria 1993
EFTA -Hungary 1993
Free Trade Agreements EFTA -Israel 1993
EFTA -Poland 1993
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 1960 EFTA -Romania 1993
Central American Common Market 1961-1975 EU -Bulgaria 1994
Caribbean Free Trade Area 1968-1972 Mexico -Bolivia 1995
Papua New Guinea and Australia Trade 1977 Mexico -Costa Rica 1995
and Commercial Relation Agreement MERCOSUR -Chile 1996
Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement 1983 MERCOSUR -Bolivia 1996
Central European Free Trade Agreement 1993 India -Nepal 1996
Andean Free Trade Area 1993 Canada -Chile 1997
European Economic Area 1994 Canada -Israel 1997
Baltic Free Trade Area 1994 Czech Republic -Israel 1997
North American Free Trade Agreement 1994 Israel -Turkey 1997
Commonwealth of Independent States 1995 Poland -Israel 1998
Group of Three 1995 CARICOM -Dominican Republic 1998
South African Development Community 2000 Czech Republic -Turkey 1998
EU -Tunisia 1998
Preferential Arrangements Hungary -Israel 1998
Hungary -Turkey 1998
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 1949-1990 Mexico -Nicaragua 1998
Latin American Free Trade Association 1961-1980 Romania -Turkey 1998
Tripartite Agreement 1968 India -Sri Lanka 1998
Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations 1973 Bulgaria -Turkey 1999
among Developing Countries Chile -Mexico 1999
West African Economic Community 1973-1997 EFTA -Morocco 1999
Bangkok Agreement 1976 EU -Israel 2000
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 1981 EU -Morocco 2000
Cooperation Agreement EU-Mexico 2000
Gulf Cooperation Council 1984 EU -South Africa 2000
Andean Community 1988-1997 Mexico -Israel 2000
General System of Trade Preferences 1989 Poland -Turkey 2000
among Developing Countries
Economic Cooperation Organization 1992 Bilateral Preferential Arrangements
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 1992
Melanesian Spearhead Group 1993 CARICOM-Venezuela 1993
Latin American Integration Association 1993 Chile-Bolivia 1993
Common Market for Eastern and 1994 Chile-Venezuela 1993
Southern Africa Chile-Colombia 1994
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 1995 CARICOM-Colombia 1995
East African Cooperation 2000 Chile-Peru 1998
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm), Foroutan (1993, 1998),
Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990), Frankel (1997), Machlup (1977) and other public sources.
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Appendix C: First stage regressions
Table 6: First stage estimates
Dependent variable: Propensity to dispute
Second stage dependent variable: deep shallow
RTAs RTAs
Major power dum. 0.28a 0.28a
(0.01) (0.01)
Ratio of military capabilities 0.04a 0.02b
(0.01) (0.01)
Multi. Trade (1960) -0.05a -0.05a
(0.01) (0.01)
Multi. Tariffs -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
ln distance -0.03a -0.03a
(0.00) (0.00)
Contiguity dum. 0.17a 0.17a
(0.03) (0.03)
Diff. GDP per capita (1960) 0.01a 0.01a
(0.00) (0.00)
Common language dum. 0.04a 0.04a
(0.01) (0.01)
Common colonizer dum. -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 12449 12449
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup
correlation in parentheses. a, b and c respectively
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time
dummies are not reported.
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